Efficient coordination in large groups is a fundamental issue in economic organizations. We consider the weak-link game with the natural feature of economies of scale, in a minimal setup with voluntary exit and merger options that allows for bi-directional changes in group size. We show that size-efficient outcomes prevail in most communities. Seed groups form that seem to set a norm of both maximal effort level and mutual trust that there will be no panic when seeing noisy dips. Despite setbacks, initial doubters are eventually converted into norm abiders. A restart further speeds up the process of coordination success.
Introduction
The essence of the coordination problem is captured in the stag-hunt story told by the philosopher Rousseau (1754). Each person in a group of primitive hunters can catch a hare independently, but together they can catch a stag for the same effort spent, which in equal shares is much more valuable than a hare for each individual hunter. However, if only one hunter cannot resist the temptation of chasing a hare running by and hence leaves his assigned post, the likelihood of being successful in catching a stag plummets so much that everybody else would be better off if they were to engage in hunting hares individually themselves. Translating this into a simultaneous-move game, there are two Nash equilibria (NE) with either everybody going after the hare or everybody going after the stag. The dilemma is that, while the latter is socially optimal and Pareto dominant, the former is risk dominant à la Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . Thus, without a strong belief that everybody will stick to their commitment to the stag hunt, fear of being left empty-handed at the end of the hunting day might lead someone to opt for the safe hare unilaterally, thereby undermining efficient coordination along the process.
1 Under certain conditions, cooperation problems such as the prisoners' dilemma can be conceptually treated as a one-shot stag-hunt game.
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Coordination problems abound in economic contexts such as organization theory, conflict resolution, global games, and bank runs among others. 3 Numerous experimental studies on coordination investigate a generalized version of the stag-hunt game called the weak-link game (van Huyck, Batalio and Beil, 1990) , where individual efforts are strictly complementary as if under a Leontief production function to produce profitable outcomes for all members in the group. For example, when each family in a village is made responsible for one piece in an embankment construction along the river nearby, the total level of protection against potential flood is determined by the lowest quality of the individual pieces. 4 For 1 Theoretical models of equilibrium selection give rise to ambiguous results. Depending on the particular form of the perturbations or learning rules, any equilibrium can be uniquely selected. For how information perturbation affects equilibrium robustness, see Morris (2008) for a brief survey. For how learning rules affect equilibrium selection, see Young (1998) . 2 See Skyrms (2004) and Dal Bo, Foster and Putterman (2010) for example. 3 See Coase (1937) , Schelling (1960) , Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , Friedman (1993) , Cooper (1999) , and Morris (2008) for example. 4 Brandts, Cooper and Fatas (2011) offer further illustrations: "When individuals' inputs to firm production are strong complements, the group's performance is constrained by its lowest performing individual. An assembly line moves no faster than the slowest person in the line, a report doesn't get finished until the last person completes their section, and a meeting can't start when a key attendee is late. If the benefits of coordinating are low and the costs of providing wasted effort are high, groups can easily become trapped in properly specified payoff function, a pure-strategy NE is any action profile where all members choose exactly the same level of effort. A higher-effort NE always Pareto dominates, but is risk-dominated by, a lower-effort NE. Risk dominance predicts the lowest, thus most inefficient coordination level.
Even though this risk dominance prediction is independent of the group size, it is realistic to assume that actual risks increase, since more people in the same group a priori means more sources for behavioral uncertainty. In fact, laboratory experiments consistently show that coordination succeeds much better in small groups. As stylized facts, groups of sizes larger than four almost surely converge to the most inefficient equilibrium, while groups of sizes no greater than four have a chance to achieve higher coordination levels. 5 However, we often observe in the real world groups much larger than those in experiments -such as firms and communities -where coordination plays a crucial role, but where these large groups have managed to achieve efficient coordination. How do they manage to do so? As one potential solution, the rather robust evidence of coordination success in 2-person groups hints at the opportunity that sufficient experience of such success may carry over into the larger groups that the same subjects form later.
Note that at the core of large-size coordination are economies of scale, provided the coordination problem of interest can be performed in varying sizes such as in the stag-hunt story. Suppose that successful coordination with two hunters yields one stag. If 2N hunters were to merely get N stags upon successful coordination, there would be no incentives whatsoever to form one large group of 2N instead of N groups of 2, while taking on the additional risk of coordination failure. Thus, growing hunter groups can empirically only be motivated by the desire for exploiting increasing returns to scale. In fact, larger groups of hunters may be more effective at hunting, simply by additional options afforded such as task specialization. For the village embankment problem, it is natural to expect much better overall flood protection with lower average costs if all families successfully join force instead of subgroups of the village do so separately, as additional safety work due to uncertainty of other neighbors' situations may be required in the latter case.
situations where everyone understands that all would benefit if all group members put forth their best effort, but no individual can unilaterally change the outcome for the better." 5 See van Huyck et al. (1990) , Camerer and Knez (2000) , Knez and Camerer (1994) , Cachon and Camerer (1996) , and Chaudhuri et al. (2009) . Table A3 .1 in Appendix 3 courtesy Weber (2006) offers a summary.
Given economies of scale, there is a natural drive among individuals to form larger groups in hope of carrying over the coordination success they achieved in smaller groups. However, as implicit in the feature of risk dominance of lesser levels of coordination, the risk increases with the group size that only one group member loses faith in fellow members' stance of sticking to the current level and thus starts a bank-run type downward spiral, particularly facing new members after merger. In the real world, breakups and exits follow if they are institutionally admissible. And the hope is that people might learn from earlier failures, consolidate their mutual trust and achieve better coordination performance, via retreat and regrouping.
This seems to be what happened with the development of China's rural area mutual-aid teams (MAT) to exploit various kind of scale economies, in the 1950s.
6 Hinton (1966) reports that most of the initial large MATs of 20-25 families broke up immediately. 7 Upon earlier experiences, the communist party specifically recommended that MATs ought to start small with 3-5 families and hoped that they would slowly grow into larger ones for better performance through mergers. They also repeatedly stressed that membership ought to be voluntary (Shue, 1980 and Lin, 1990) . For MATs, the average size of participating households increased from 4.2 in 1950 to 8.4 by end of 1955, along with steady growth of agricultural productivity and output (Lin, 1990) . From 1956 on, however, peasant membership in a people's commune became increasingly mandatory by party decree. As a result, agricultural productivity plummeted in 1958. This failure is very much reminiscent of the large-size coordination failure witnessed in previous experimental designs without voluntary regrouping. Yet, the success up until 1956 suggests that a voluntary association setup might indeed solve the large-size coordination problem, by slowly building up internal trust and increasing the size of the cooperatives while learning from failures as documented 6 Due to the communist party's land reform that ended in 1952, a typical farming family's landholding is highly fragmented and too small for that household to raise a draft animal alone. Thus, certain gains can be obtained by pooling the land and farm tools of several households, in addition to need for collective work required for tasks like irrigation (Chinn, 1980) . See Shue (1980) for further extended discussion of motivations and developments. In fact, this kind of scale economy is common for rural areas in many developing countries and in different forms such as joint risk sharing and efforts in tasks like barn raising.
7 "In spite of all these criticisms most people wanted to continue mutual-aid production. They envied the results achieved by those few groups that still functioned." "… Much more natural were the many small groups that had arisen spontaneously in 1946, on the basis of mutual interests recognized by friends and relatives. These successful nuclei had been suddenly and mechanically enlarged when the Communist Party of Lucheng County issued a call for organized production in 1947." Hinton (1966, p. 530ff). in reoccurring exits and collapses. More generally, real-world firms (or production and project teams) often start small, some get dissolved and some grow larger, in a similar vein.
In this study, we investigate in experiments how efficient coordination fully exploiting economies of scale might naturally result, in a voluntary group formation environment with a minimal set of rules that allow for bi-directional variations in group sizes. In a 10-person community, groups of various sizes separately play the weak-link game for a cycle of 3 rounds before they enter the next cycle in a different group composition. In the regrouping stage, each person first decides whether to exit the current group. Then, each casts a merger vote on each of the remaining groups and split-off singles, and mergers go through based on a mutual super majority rule. After 7 such cycles, the same will be repeated in a restart.
In 5 out of a total of 6 communities, a large group is formed with almost-efficient coordination levels that fully exploit the existing economies of scale. This process is further speeded up in the restart. Typically, small-sized seed groups with efficient coordination form early, a norm which subsequent newcomers can follow. In general, incumbents in the seed groups are usually rather tolerant to reoccurring fear-induced small dips below the previous level of coordination, which would have entailed breakdown of coordination in fixed large groups 8 in contrast. Furthermore, outsiders seem to be sensitized by the observation of good and stable performance in the seed group, as well as its expected sustained growth. 9 Thus they strive for a high coordination level in their own group, to make themselves acceptable for the seed group. Exit proves to be essential in dealing with setbacks. In other words, our bi-directional regrouping setup can fully exploit the stylized fact that coordination succeeds much more easily in small groups: people have a chance to retreat and regroup themselves in case of setbacks and do not need to suffer from an irreversible domino effect of the weak link breaking down. In addition, newly formed groups resulting from mutual acceptance generally have the common belief of a higher coordination level among the members.
The next section reviews the related experimental literature. Section 3 discusses our design.
Section 4 discusses the data analysis, and is followed by the concluding remarks in the final section.
Review of Related Literature
As surveyed in Devetag and Ortmann (2007) , under setups of fixed group sizes, the success rate for coordination generally increases with smaller group size, smaller costs or higher benefits, finer action space, 10 more rounds, and more information. 11 One important strategy for improving coordination success is to scale up financial incentives, which can overcome a history of coordination failure under certain conditions. Brandts and Cooper (2006a) study coordination in a minimum effort game with five effort levels, keeping the payoff associated with the minimum constant for the first ten rounds. Then, they increase the benefits associated with the efficient equilibrium, and observe a higher incidence of coordination success as the efficient equilibrium becomes significantly more attractive. 12 Goeree and Holt (2005) show, in 2 and 3 person games, that variation of the cost has a significant effect on coordination success.
Also, while information is highly limited in our setup, full information on all members' effort levels may further help coordination to succeed (Brandts and Cooper, 2006b ). Other measures to combat the fragility of trust in fellow members' risk tolerance include having leadership establish itself in a heterogeneous environment (Brandts, Cooper and Fatas, 2011) and allowing for communication in various ways (Blume and Ortmann, 2007 and Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher, 2009 ). And, Feri, Irlenbusch and Sutter (2010 find that teams coordinate more efficiently than individuals.
Several studies demonstrate that a suitable bonus or punishment based on the coordination outcome can enhance coordination. Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel (2002) have groups of size 7 compete, either for a bonus or for the right to a standard coordination payoff. The latter form of competition proves to be more effective and achieves a high level of coordination in 4 out of 12 groups.
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10 For example, instead of 7 effort levels with integers 1-7, one could use 100 steps in the interval [1, 7] . 11 For instance, make everybody's effort in the previous round common knowledge instead of just the group minimum.
12 Note that complete records on everyone's effort decisions were provided that facilitated coordination in 4-person groups. Hamman, Rick and Weber (2007) investigate additional forms of financial incentives under the same framework, but without further improvement in terms of coordination success. 13 The highest difference in terms of the average minimum between this Intergroup Competition and the control treatments appears in the second-to-last period, with 4.42 vs. 2.17 (or 3.42 vs. 1.17 as translated into our payoff function (1)). Our result reveals a much bigger gap, with 5.32 in the main vs. 0.00 in the 8-person controls.
Allowing people to move between groups of their own choice has the potential to improve coordination. Several studies on public goods experiments investigate the effect of voluntary exit and endogenous group growth. Ehrhart and Keser (1999) allow people to freely exit and join existing groups without success of high efficiency, establishing the stylized facts of free riders chasing the cooperators through instable groups. Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2008, 2009) observe moderate effect of improved performance by introducing entry restrictions in combination with free exit. Charness and Yang (2009) achieve much higher level of efficiency by allowing, in addition to free exit, exclusion and merger by voting. By truncating the scope of the scale factors, however, they observe group stability plummet considerably while still maintaining very high contribution level, which suggests that the effect of exclusion might be endogenous to the process and therefore not necessarily crucial to the observed success of the regrouping mechanism. In studies without free exit or growth in group size, Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2005) Restrictions on entry appear to be promising in achieving high coordination levels. 14 Weber (2006) has a design that starts with 2 players playing the weak-link game for 5 or 6 rounds, while 10 others watch on. Then, the onlookers are randomly added to the group according to various exogenous growth plans over a span of 15 rounds, with mostly one entry at a time. The payoff function is independent of group size. 15 The main finding is that three out of 9 groups achieve efficient coordination around group size close to 12, with erosions after the peak. The average group minimum tops around 50% of the optimal level. These results illustrate how volatile it is to both achieve and maintain common trust needed for efficient large-size coordination, which can be more successfully dealt with in our design.
Salmon and Weber (2009) introduce endogenous growth procedures. They start with the 10-person weak-link game for 3 rounds. The two with the highest average effort are put into the so-called high group, while the others are included in a separate low group, for 7 more 14 Raab (2005) , applying Ehrhart and Keser (1999) , fails to avoid the typical coordination failure by simply allowing subjects to freely choose among two or more groups in each round. 15 In an earlier version of Weber (2006), there is a treatment with a manager in control of group size changes over time. Managers are given incentives to achieve large size as well as a high level of coordination, which is equivalent to having some form of economies of scale with the manager reaping all surpluses.
rounds of the weak-link game. After that, 15 further rounds will be played where members of the low group have the option to enter the high group in each round, subjecting to different screening rules. There are economies of scale for groups of different sizes, with size-invariant effort costs. Compared to the Baseline, the entry-screening treatments seem to be effective in raising the level of coordination to about 50% of the maximum in the endogenous-entry phase, qualitatively similar to Weber (2006) . Moreover, as shown in their Figure 1 , there is a slightly decreasing trend for coordination in the High group at larger sizes. By contrast, the trend is strictly increasing in our design. 16 Note, unlike our design with exit, the main group can only grow in the previous two studies.
This way, if e.g. an extremely cautious person is "wrongly" admitted into the group, its expected contagious effect may stop and ruin the initially promising growth process. In other words, without option to separate oneself from those bad contagious situations, the performance of the growing team may not be robust. In fact, retreat and regroup with transient downsizing turn out to be crucial for the more robust success in our design, despite the costs of coordination failure increasing in group size. For comparison, a similarly "minimal" design in a public goods setup that also allows for retreat and regroup, such as Ahn et al. (2008 Ahn et al. ( , 2009 ), may not be as effective at improving efficiency due to additional pressure of free riding motivations.
Experimental Design and Procedure

A. Voluntary Regrouping Treatment
In the voluntary regrouping treatment, we start with a 10-person community in the group format (2, 2, 3, 3) and have subjects play the weak-link game for 7 cycles. Each cycle consists of 3 rounds of effort decisions, followed by a regrouping period except for the last cycle.
17 After that, the exact same procedure that starts with a random grouping will be 17 For the sake of robustness, we want members to have extended within-group experience before they make their subsequent regrouping decisions. Regrouping just after one round of interaction may cause too much volatility. Too many rounds in each cycle, i.e. more than 3, may force us to implement too few voting periods for the regrouping results to converge, due to time constraints for standard sessions. In fact, we also believe it is realistic to assume that real world groups do not move to regrouping with only minimum of joint experience. Similar concerns apply to conceivable robustness checks with alternative initial formats such as 4-3-3 or 5-4-1 repeated with the same subjects in the community. We will refer to them as the Main and Restart blocks subsequently. Random matching at the beginning of Restart provides subjects with a clean slate to potentially reinvent themselves if they learned anything from the previous run. The coordination (weak-link) game subjects in all treatments play is as follows.
Coordination game: In each round, subjects are to choose a number from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
as their effort levels, knowing the size of the current group. 18 Let denotes the effort level of player i and = min { } the minimum effort choice in the group. Then, i's payoff at the effort vector e is (1) ( , ) = 7 + ( )(2 − ).
To capture economies of scale, C(n) is set to increase with the group size n, with C(n) = 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2, for n = 2 and 3, n = 4 and 5, n = 6 and 7, and n = 8, 9, and 10, respectively. The corresponding payoff tables are provided in the printed instructions and can be found in Appendix 1.
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Several features of our payoff functions are worth noticing. First, by replacing C(n) with c(n) = n/4 for n =2, 3,…, 10, we obtain a smoother version of (1). We set c(4) = C(4) =1, as well as B(n)/C(n) = 2 for all n, to maintain as much compatibility with the literature as possible, where the generic payoff function takes the form of
Second, a reasonable alternative form to our (1) is
Unlike (1), the costs in (2) is independent of the group size while it displays increasing returns to scale as (1), a feature also shared by the payoff function in Salmon and Weber (2009). Compared to ours, (2) induces higher relative attractiveness of larger group due to size-independent effort costs, but also the potential caveat that the formation of efficient large groups were mainly driven by the increasing benefit-cost gap. Thus, we opted for what appears a priori a tougher test with (1) as the payoff function instead of (2).
instead of 2-2-3-3 here. Since we expect a lot more initial coordination failure there, we expect less success with the same 21-period, 7-cycle setup. For a conclusive insight, one might need to also extend the length of the main block considerably. In general, the new methodological concerns raised would outweigh the benefits of helping solve the robustness question. 18 Note that the choice set commonly used in the literature ranges from 1 to 7. Our payoff-equivalent form here greatly simplifies the explanation in the instructions, due to the economies of scale feature. 19 To avoid excessive losses in a single round and a negative payoff in the end, we set the lower bound of the payoff to -1. This adjustment is needed only in a few cases when the difference between one's choice and the minimum is extremely large, which turns out to be non-binding ex post, i.e., it never happened during the experiment.
Third, since we wish to explain the payoff consequences in form of payoff tables as commonly is the case in the literature, we elect to use C(n) instead of c(n) which cut the total number of payoff tables from 9 to 4, to reduce cognitive burden associated with the task at hand. In addition, C(8) = C(10) creates a situation that growing in size generates increased social efficiency by having two more people sharing the optimal scale effect but no individual gains due to unchanged scale factors.
The regrouping period is at the core of our design. It consists of two stages, exit and merger as described below, which together constitutes a minimal set of rules that enables variation of group sizes in both directions.
Exit: At the start of each group-formation period, everyone can decide whether to exit the current group. Note that the group minimum is shown to its members but not to other groups, after each round. In addition, all groups' size and minimum effort levels in the cycle are publicly listed within the community during the regrouping period. That is, subjects can compare the minimum and size of their groups with other groups within a community. If one exits, she becomes a "single" in the merger stage.
Merger: After the exit stage, the community becomes a collection of intermediate groups.
Now, each subject needs to cast one vote for each intermediate group that reflects her preference of merger. In addition to the information subjects have at the Exit stage, we have a specific system to label an intermediate group, which helps subjects unambiguously link it to the original group it has split from. This also implies that there is no information about a split-off single's effort behavior other than the minimum ones in his previous group's game plays. The votes will determine the result of the voluntary merger process.
 Voluntary Merger: If at least 60% of the subjects in each group of a group pair agree to merge with the other, the merger has a chance to go through. However, there are often more than one such pairs waiting for a merger. In this case, the willing pair with the highest mutual vote ratio, the share of all approving members in the group pair, will merge first. Ties will be broken randomly. The procedure will be repeated with the remaining intermediate groups until no further such willingness to merge exists. 20 20 The number of 60% super majority rule follows Charness and Yang (2009), as with the natural candidate of 50% simple majority the trust based a less consensual merger might be too shaky for stable outcomes after the merger. After one group is merged with another group, the newly formed group no longer can merge with other groups within this stage. This is different from Charness and Yang (2009)  Random Merger: If there is more than one single left after all voluntary mergers have taken place, the remaining singles will be randomly combined into 2-or 3-person groups conditional on the number of leftover singles. If there is only one single left, she will stay so in the next cycle. She will not have any effort to make and will get a fixed payoff of 6 points for every round in the next cycle.
Once the regrouping period is over, the outcome is displayed as public information.
Subjects will face a screen showing which two of the groups have been merged, if any, and to which group they now belong. Subsequent to that, a new cycle starts with the newly formed groups. The instructions for subjects can be found in Appendix 1.
Finally, note that we also contemplated whether to conduct a treatment with an exogenous growth plan for size in the spirit of Weber (2006) but decided against it. First, Weber's (2006) results are not conclusive enough to help us convincingly nail down any particular growth plan. Though the general feeling is that slowly growing the size should increase efficiency, due to too small a sample size for each of his treatments, we fail to find a fitting and justifiable specification for our purpose. Second, exogenous procedures require additional third parties and thus transaction costs. Once an endogenous procedure solves the large-size coordination problem sufficiently well such as in our study, it is hard to imagine any reason for a real-world demand to implement an exogenous one instead, even if in lab conditions the latter would perform equally well.
B. Control Treatment
In the control treatments, people play 10 rounds of 2-person, 3-person, and 8-person coordination games with the corresponding payoff table as in the regrouping treatment for the same group size, in fixed groups. In each round, every subject knows his own play history and the history of the past group minimum. No interaction between groups is available.
Depending on the treatment and recruiting outcomes, there are 6 to 16 subjects in a session.
In addition, we have 8, 8, and 4 groups each for fixed 2-, 3-, and 8-person conditions. Note that 10 rounds is the common feature in the established literature for fixed-size designs, which proved to be sufficient for the stylized facts of large group failure and small group success to emerge in convergence. Thus, we can compare the initial as well as the convergent levels of effort with our main blocks without going the full length of 21 rounds.
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C. Implementation of Experiment
In September 2009, 132 undergraduate students mainly from Peking University (China) with no previous experience of the task participated in the experiments. Subjects were recruited by Internet advertisements offering monetary rewards for participating in interactive decision tasks.
Participants received 8 RMB for showing up, in addition to any money from the coordination game described here. Each subject was randomly seated facing a personal computer with sufficient separation in the Guanghua Behavioral Laboratory. The subjects were given written instructions about the rules and payoffs of the game (see Appendix 1) and were asked to follow the instructions as the experimenter read them aloud. An ensuing test made sure that the subjects correctly understood the problem at hand, and further explanations were given when necessary. The program for subject interaction was based on Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed of their earnings. They would be paid anonymously in cash one by one. Table 1 provides an overview of the numbers of independent samples, and subjects used, for all treatments. For the regrouping treatment, we have 6 communities with 10 subjects each in 3 sessions. The exchange rate is 15 points = 1 RMB. The average payment including the show-up fee is ca. 42 RMB, with average session duration of about 90 minutes. 22 For controls, the average payoff is ca. 20 RMB with average session duration of 30 minutes. 21 Note, a tacit purpose for our Controls was to see whether the PKU subjects behaved similarly in this standard 10-round setup as in previous known studies. If they had not, we might have had trouble interpreting the results in the main treatments. With expected length of 21 rounds, data up to the 10th round may not be conclusive. Once the expected "regular" convergence pattern emerges in the 10-round design, our goal of comparing converging patterns between the endogenous treatments and the Controls is well served, and we do not expected any further insight from a 21-round design for the Controls. 22 1 USD = ca. 7 RMB at that time. The average hourly wage for a non-skilled student job was below 10 RMB. 
Experimental Results
A. Aggregate Analysis
Our experiment exhibits a high degree of success in achieving large-group efficient coordination. The minimum effort, along with the largest group's size, increases steadily over time and stays near the highest possible level. In addition, the restart block achieves a similar coordination level even more rapidly.
Due to variations in group composition, the simple averages for effort and minimum effort do not fully reflect the performance in the community. As measures of performance, we thus use both size-weighted average minimum (WM) and weighted efficiency (WE), in addition to non-weighted average minimum. Let S denote the society size without singles in our experiment, and no-single subjects are sorted as ∈ {1,2, … , } . Formally, we have
, where ( ) denotes the minimum effort of subject i's group; and ( ) = ( ( ), ( )) denotes i's would-be profit if i were to choose the minimum effort in her group. WE is the theoretical payoff the society would receive without any miscoordination. Also, singles are omitted since they have no record of effort. In fact, singles are rare in the voluntary regrouping treatment, accounting for 2.6% of all subject-level data with 19 observations. block, there appears to be a slightly stronger increase in effort immediately following the regrouping stage. In the restart, however, it is highest in the middle round. To discuss group size dynamics, we focus on size of the largest group in each community.
In Figure 2 , average group size of the largest groups is depicted in the dashed-line curve, while the average minimum of these largest groups is show in the solid line. Group size grows hand in hand with the effort level. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirms that the average group size in the 21st round is significantly larger than that in the first round, (p=0.0625, two-sided).
In fact, the seed groups maintain some very high coordination levels already from the second cycle on. In addition, an efficient large group forms faster in the restart block. The average size of the seed group is already 7 by the 3rd cycle in the restart communities with Note that the restart block is designed to shake off potential undesirable deadlock, and to further promote desirable trend formations that may emerge from the first block. Observation 2 (c) offers a validation for this design feature.
For comparisons with the controls, Figure 4 illustrates the trends of average minimum and average choice in the controls. Avg. choice (avg. minimum) in the fixed 2-p, 3-p and 8-p groups change from 4.19, 4.00 and 3.63 (3.00, 2.63 and 1.00) in the first round to 4.63, 3.17 and 0 (4.50, 2.88 and 0) in the last round, respectively. Most notable is the total coordination failure in 8-p groups, which is consistent with the results in previous experiments. 23 Note that in our design the payoff function is the same for the 8-, 9-, and 10-p groups. The basic phenomenon in the regrouping treatment is that subjects gradually increase their efforts after a start comparable to those of the controls. This is confirmed by comparing the averages among treatments, which are shown in Table 2 . Averages in the first 3 rounds reflect subjects' initial beliefs. While they are quite the same in both the regrouping and control treatments, the former evolves into much better performance at enhancing coordination in the last 3 rounds. The table also shows the restart effect. Restart blocks start with higher averages in the first 3 rounds due to the experience of norm adoption on the part of efficient large groups from the main block. formed in the regrouping treatment to that in the controls. All of the largest groups in the regrouping treatment achieve a high coordination level of at least 5, with groups of at least 6 members being formed in 5 out of 6 communities.
In fact, the regrouping treatment enhances coordination mainly by forming efficient large groups. Table 3 compares the distribution of minimum choice in the last 3 rounds among regrouping and control treatments for the same-sized groups. For 2-p groups, all treatments achieve the highest two coordination levels, 5 or 6, at about the same rates at 59%, 59%, and 63%, respectively. Mann-Whitney-U tests confirm the clear improvement in efficiency (see Table A2 in Appendix 3). 27 In the first round, subjects' initial choices are almost the same in the main block and control treatments. In the last 3 rounds, there is no significant difference between the regrouping and control treatments with respect to 2-p and 3-p groups, except for 8-or 9-p groups (the p-values are 0.029 and 0.016 for the main and restart blocks, respectively). This significant difference in large groups is the result of the subjects' responses to the voluntary regrouping design: They form efficiently coordinated large groups from the initial 2-or 3-p groups. In addition, the restart effect as shown in Figure 1 proves to be significant for the 
B. Regressions on Merger and Exit Decisions
Exit and merger play vital roles in the formation of efficiently coordinated large groups.
now analyze the determinants of these decisions with regression models. Let * be the dependent variable for subject j in community i in cycle t, and the vector of independent variables, accordingly. Let be any form of subject-or group-level heterogeneity, and let be an identically independent error term for subject j in community i in cycle t and follow standard normal distribution. Then, * is given by the following equation,
where ij α is a scalar and β is a vector of parameters. The true dependent variable is = 1{ * >0} . Maximum likelihood estimation is used to fit the model.
A critical point in this analysis is how we control for repeated observations of the same subjects or the same communities. We use standard error clustered at community level. This a relatively conservative approach to correct repeated observations within the same community,
following Liang and Zeger (1986) . The significance test of coefficients is robust and minimizes the likelihood of type-1 errors (false rejection of the null).
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Exit Decision. -The regression results of the exit decision are presented in Table 4 . Restart, the dummy for a restart, is not significant and does not influence the significance of other variables from comparison between Model 1 and 2.
The opportunity costs of staying are related to variables such as Own group minimum, the average minimum of one's own group, and Own group size, the size of this group. Maximum of outgroup's minimum, the largest average minimum among groups in the same community other than one's own group, also has a significant effect. Since it is the indicator of the coordination level in other groups, 29 higher prospective earnings in another group will make subjects more willing to exit. Own choice, the average level of one's choices in last cycle, is significantly positive, which indicates that subjects with higher choices are more eager to exit than those with lower choices. In general, subjects are inclined to exit a small-sized or poorly-coordinated group, which is further affected by the condition of the best performing outside groups. 28 Note that singles are treated differently. In the regression of the exit decision, singles are omitted because they make no exit decision. For the merger decision, since singles have no record of effort or minimum effort in the last cycle, we add dummies to indicate whether a group is single. Also, singles are rare in our experiment, accounting for 2.6% of all subject-level data with 19 observations. Thus, their inclusion would not significantly affect the regression results. 29 Alternatives are the average of the outgroup's minimum and efficiency. However, as subjects can just choose to merge with the group with a higher minimum and overlook the group with a lower minimum after exit, they appear to be less important.
OBSERVATION 5: Subjects tend to exit if their own current group has a low minimum and small size, if their own choices are relatively high, or if one of minimums in other groups
is high. 
1) and does not influence significance of coefficients of other variables (see Models 1 and 2).
This implies the determinants of merger decision are similar in main and restart blocks.
In Models 1 and 2, a high outgroup minimum and large outgroup size have a significant positive effect, which implies that subjects tend to merge with those with better payoffs. On the other hand, a high own group minimum reduces the inclination to merge, as members enjoying a high coordination level have higher standards for merger candidates. Own group size has no significant effect while the dummy for own group size ≥ 8 is significantly negative since economies of scale are truncated when the size reaches 8. In fact, no merger went through on all 18 occasions of regrouping with 8-or 9-person groups. Notes: Robust standard errors clustering in community in parentheses *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
If the own/out group is not a single individual in the last cycle, the dummy of own/out group not single is 1; otherwise it is 0. The dummy of own group not single is not significant in any models, which indicates that we cannot reject the view that the singles' consideration regarding merger choice is identical to a 1-p group with minimum 0. By contrast, the dummy of outgroup not single is significant in all models. This suggests that subjects in particular do not trust singles for their reliability. 30 The main message here is that efficient large-sized 30 The interpretation of the coefficient of own/out group not single is tricky here. The coefficient being zero means that a single can be equivalent to a group of size 1 (Own group size = 0) and with minimum 0 (own/out group minimum = 0) although a (non-intermediate) single actually has no history for others to view. Many factors can cause the dummy to be significant. If no history is equivalent to the worst history, or the marginal effect from size 2 to size 1 is different from other neighboring levels, the null hypothesis should be rejected. groups are attractive. For good reasons as the final performance proves, however, these groups are usually conservative in admitting outsiders.
OBSERVATION 6: Subjects desire mergers with large-sized and highly coordinated groups and distrust singles. Members in highly coordinated groups or larger-than-8-person
groups are more cautious when approving mergers.
C. Push-and-Pull and Retreat-and-Regroup: Patterns of Success and Failure
The regressions reveal a basic push-and-pull principle at work: Promising seed groups pull subjects from other groups, bad performances in a group push members away. However, without the chance of retreat in the form of free exit before regroup, frequent setbacks may severely limit the prospect of size-efficient outcomes. Here we summarize further detailed observations on the process of group formation based on data provided in Appendix 2, from which one can track any subject's effort and group identity for each round.
Communities start with small groups. It is expected that one or two groups in each community will achieve a near efficient coordination level. These (seed) groups become magnets to others, while their incumbent members cautiously pick willing applicants among those with good coordination histories. This causes willing and enlightened subjects in relatively poorly-performing groups to exit. In (often randomly formed) small-sized new groups, they hope to meet other like-minded subjects to achieve a high enough level of coordination as signals of norm conformity in the eyes of the seed group. This dynamic steadily leads to the formation of a large group that can take the fullest advantage of the available economies of scale, while maintaining a near maximal level of coordination.
Yet, the process of achieving success is not without obstacles and setbacks. Uncertainty regarding fellow group members' commitment and willingness to take a certain level of risk to uphold high effort choices, and fear of suffering from the loss due to even one player losing faith and heading for a safer way out, leads to one's doing the same earlier than anybody else. This very phenomenon of "bank runs" has been observed in our data at times. Some initially promising seed groups that have achieved relatively large sizes get brought down by this (e.g., community 6 in the main block). In one community (community 5), such experiences have exerted such a negative contagious effect that people have become shell-shocked, so much so that they have never even managed to stabilize at a mid-sized group.
Fortunately, in the majority of communities, this fear has been curbed well enough by the induced effects of our bi-directional regrouping setup. Most incumbents in a seed group would hold firm to previous levels of choices despite small shocks of reduced efforts after mergers, both by entrants and due to anticipating adjustment by some fellow incumbents.
Furthermore, in most cases, in realizing their pivotal status, those safe-betters would be willing to raise their efforts immediately in the next rounds. Consequently, despite repeated experience of dips, most seed groups manage to grow in size on almost-efficient coordination levels to achieve size-efficient outcomes.
Conclusions
The presence of economies of scale is a necessary feature for endogenous large-size coordination. Without it, voluntary association would trivially lead to the minimal group size with no loss on efficiency. Given this, our voluntary regrouping setup greatly helps to create conditions where members in a large group all manage to check their proverbial fear at the door and trust each other to hold on to the highest level of effort through thick and thin. The motivation is entirely strategic as further corroborated by the observation that people refuse to take on more risk only for the benefit of the left-out minority, once no further economies of scale are available.
The primary function of our regrouping design is to sort people with similar attitudes for the weak-link game into groups by voluntary association. In seed groups, some norm seems to establish itself with the feature of high effort and, more importantly, a high tolerance threshold required from their members. The success of the seed group along with an established history that shows its robustness against perturbations or noise also functions as a standing role model that the unsettled remainder of the community can use to adjust their risk attitude and assessment. However, as this process is not always smooth, sometimes even with severe setbacks due to the intrinsic fragility of trust in fellow members' tolerance levels, it is crucial that the regrouping setup allows for a decline in the group size. In fact, we believe that lack of an option for people to retreat and regroup is the very reason why some other endogenous-size setups (Weber, 2006 and Salmon and Weber, 2009) have not been as stable as ours at achieving efficient outcomes.
Our goal was to explore how efficiency naturally arises from a minimum set of facilitating features. Our voluntary regrouping setup contains one rule each for how groups can grow and decline in size. While the free exit rule seems unique, and the mutuality of agreement necessary, the specific supermajority rule of 60% can be further varied. Also note that our design is only one of many potential ways to solve the large-size coordination problem. In 
.1 General Issues
Before the start, 10 subjects will be assigned to a "community". Each community will start with four groups, two of them with two persons and two with three. After a "cycle" of three rounds of plays, there will be a "community regrouping" period. The number of groups, and how many people there are in each group, may change when starting the next cycle. There will be 21 rounds of play in total and thus 6 community regroupings.
A 1.2.2 Choosing the "numbers"
Starting from the first round, you will need to pick one number from {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} in each round of play. Your choice of number and the smallest number chosen in your current group will determine your payoff in lab dollars in that round. And this payoff may change with the size of your current group as displayed in the following formulae. At the time of your decision in each round, you will see on your monitor the information about the "size of your current group" and the "smallest number in group" for the groups you belonged to in all past rounds. After this round is completed, you will be informed of the smallest number in your group of this round, your own choice of number, and your payoff in this round.
A 1.2.3 Group reformation in community
After a cycle of three rounds of choosing numbers, there will be a group reformation stage within the community. It consists of two phases. In the first phase, you decide voluntarily whether or not to exit the current group you belong to. In the second phase, you will cast votes on whether to merge your current group with other existing groups or singles, or join other groups or singles if you are a single yourself at this stage. During the whole stage of group reformation, the monitor will display the information about the smallest chosen numbers in the past 3 rounds for each group in the community. In the second phase of merger, all temporary or intermediate groups including singles are listed. However, the "smallest number in the group" attached to each member refers to respective group minimums before voluntary exit.
Exit Phase: More specifically, in the exit phase, you can choose to exit your current group and become a "single". All such singles and the remnants of previous groups (free of these singles) are called "intermediate groups". At the end of the exit phase, the information about each intermediate group's size and its name will be displayed. If the name has a letter "a" attached to the original group name, it then refers to the group formed by those in the original group that did not choose to "exit". If other letters like "b" or "c" etc are attached, they refer to singles that result from exit.
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For example, in the second round of play, a group of size 4 before exit is named 2A. Two subjects in 2A chose to stay and thus form the intermediate group named 2Aa. Two other subjects chose to exit and get randomly assigned the names 2Ab and 2Ac as singles. For any pair of intermediate groups, if at least 60% of members in each of the two groups vote Yes for merger with the other, then they are called an "admissible" pair for merger. We then calculate the "degree of mutual votes" for each admissible pair, and sort all admissible pairs accordingly. 32 The admissible pair with the highest degree of mutual votes will be merged first. If two such pairs have the same degree of mutual votes, the pair that has the highest total group members will merge. If this total number is the same too, then one will be randomly chosen to merge. After this, from the admissible pairs formed by the remaining groups, we will again merge the pair with the highest degree of mutual votes. We will repeat this procedure until there is no admissible pair left.
For example, let us have two intermediate groups 1Aa with 3 persons and 1Ba with 4 persons. Suppose group 1Aa has two people who vote Yes to merge with 1Ba while 1Ba has 4 people doing the same with 1Aa. Because 2/3 > 60% and 4/4 > 60%, they make up an "admissible pair". Suppose there is another 3-person group 1Ca with 3 persons voting Yes to merge with 1Ba, while 1Ba has 4 persons voting Yes to merge with 1Ca, then (1Ba, 1Ca) also is an admissible pair. And it has a higher degree of mutual votes than the pair (1Aa, 1Ba).
After the voluntary merger process is closed in this group-reformation period, there might be some singles left. We will randomly put them into either 2-person or 3-person groups, with the principle of avoiding singles for the next cycle of the number-choosing play. For example, if there are 6 singles, then there will be two new 3-person groups. With 5 singles left, there will be a 2-person and a 3-person group, etc. However, if after the voluntary merger process, there is exactly one single left, then this single will get 6 points for each of the 3 rounds in the next cycle, without any decision to 31 In case all subjects elect to exit the group, there will be no intermediate group with "a" from this group. 32 "Degree of mutual votes" is calculated as the ratio of total Yes votes to each other over the sum of sizes of these two groups.
make. S/he will be put in as a single intermediate group in the merger stage of the next group-reformation period. After this group-reformation period, you will get information about which intermediate groups are merged voluntarily and which ones are not.
A 1.3 Final Payoff
We will pay you earnings from all the rounds in RMB at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is:
15 points = 1 RMB.
Please wait patiently for our instruction. We will call your seat number one by one and you will get the payoff in the separate room behind you privately.
Note on Program: The game will proceed only after everyone in the same community has pressed the "OK" button, at each decision stage. Your choice  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  0  7  ------1  6  8  -----2  5  7  9  ----3  4  6  8  10  ---4  3  5  7  9  11  --5  2  4  6  8  10  12  -6  1  3  5  7  9 11 13 Note: (1) numbers in the tables give you the points one gets with "your choice" given the "smallest number in group" accordingly;
(2) "-" indicates that this combination is not meaningful. For example if "your choice" = 3, then "smallest number in group" cannot be 4, 5, or 6; (3) if the payoff as calculated with the formulae is below -1, then it will be re-set at -1-that is to say, in any round of play, you may lose 1 point at most.
Appendix 2: Group Formations and Individual Decisions on Effort and Exit: Complete Records with Comments
Let us label the 60 subjects with c-s for transparent references, where c = 1,…,6 refers to the community number and s = 1,…,9,10 the ID within the community. In the following tables, columns refer to subjects in the society. The same color/shade background indicates belonging to the same group, with exception of the singles. Entry numbers indicate the subjects' effort choices.
For community 1, we summarize in more details the process as to how large and efficient groups are typically formed, which is quite typical. For the "failure" community 5 and the "fight of norms" community 6, we also have summaries besides the side comments.
Community 1 (with detailed discussion)
Main (first 21 rounds): Summary Two groups started with efficient coordination at min= 6 in at least 2 rounds. In the regrouping stage, most of the subjects in the other groups exited, in order to join the two efficient groups. The two efficient groups merged into a larger seed group, and other subjects were randomly merged.
In the second cycle, the seed group maintained its efficient coordination. In the regrouping stage, most of the subjects in the inefficient groups chose to exit. The seed group selected the one with the best group-minimum history.
In the third cycle, the seed group withstood the dip to min=4 in the first round caused by the new entrant. None of the other 5 incumbents panicked. The new entrant experimented with choosing 6 the next round. And the group got back to min=6 in the remaining two rounds. The same pattern repeated over and over in later cycles. But the majority in the seed group stood firm, through rounds of occasional doubts by some members. At the same time, one 2-p group achieved min= (5,5,6) and entered the seed group without breakup. "Oddity": First, subjects in the other 2-p group did not choose to exit despite the fact that they were in the most inefficient group. Second, a member in the seed group exited. As he then expressed his willingness to merge with either of the efficient groups, denied by both, this seemed to be a mistake or noise decision. (The inefficient group was willing to take him, which he declined.)
In the fourth regrouping stage, a member (1-5) in the seed group chose 4 in the last round and then exited and joined the remaining 2-p group. Merger between the 2-p and the seed groups failed due to insufficient supporting votes.
In the fifth regrouping stage, subject 1-5 exited the 3-p group again. All 3 subjects wished to join the seed group, which preferred the 2-p sub-group.
In the sixth regrouping stage, the seed group now at the maximum level of scale economy declined merger with extra subjects, although a few members were willing.
Restart (Last 21 rounds): Summary
In the first cycle, all the subjects chose high effort levels. Both of the two 3-p groups were favored by all the subjects outside the group and thus merged with each other. The 2-p group received the least votes only because their history was tainted with a single min=5 in one round.
In the 2 nd regrouping stage, the 2-p group merged with the 6-p seed group. And after that, the two subjects left out never managed to find sufficient support to be admitted into the seed group. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 21 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
[1] Typical exit behavior throughout all sessions, when group is small! Somehow, subjects gamble on sending the signal of voluntary exit and think that as singles they might be more likely to be admitted into a bigger group. This might be due to the rule of merging highest mutual agreement. Singles may expect a higher merger ranking than with their previous groups. In addition, they might expect large groups to be conservative and preferring mergers with a small group than with a large group: Data in Weber (2006) seem to support this!
[2] Subject 1-7 seems to have the strategy of starting with e=4 in the first period of each new group; follow the min of last period or jump to e=6, depending on min = or < 4.
[3] Non-sensible exit! Maybe just by mistake, as it never happened again from the same person.
[4] Ditto 1 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Exit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Exit 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 10 5 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 11 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 12 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Exit 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 13 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 14 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 15 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Exit 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 16 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 17 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 18 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Exit 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 19 5 5 6 5 6 5 5 6 6 6 20 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 21 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
[1] In first 3 cycles, one subject each did e=5 to start in first period as safety check, only to switch back to 6 in the next. However, many more followed suit thereafter, making it like a norm. Yet, we have sufficiently many subjects willing to stick to e=6, likely in fear of triggering a bad snowballing effect this way. Table A2 [1] He was aiming at merger with the green 3p group but ended up randomly merged with subject 2-0.
[2] e=6 as he knew his partner's was e=6 throughout in previous group. 2-10 started section 1 with e=6 only to be disappointed by min=1! A random match made in heaven!
[3] This 3p group increased their min from 2 to 5 steadily over 6 periods without any group changes.
[4] 2-6 here wanted to join the min=6 group, which took his partner however. This exit led to two 4p groups forming.
[5] Exit for better, but 4p+3p groups achieved higher mutual votes.
[6] [Noise might kill!] 2-4 is persistent at e=5, which brought down the entire coordination level to 5.
[7] 7p group unanimously ready to merge with this 2p one, but 2p group had conflicting preference between merger with single or 7p.
[8] Both voted for 7p. [1] A case for the merger rule: mutual agreement was 100% between orange group and each of singles 2-2, 2-6 and 2p group (2-3, 2-7), but the rule selected the larger merger.
[2] Both split-offs from this 2p group got the same votes from the 4p group, and merger was decided by coin flip.
[3] 4/5 wanted to merge with the 2-p group with min=6, while only 2/5 wanted to merge with 3-p group with min=5. Although min=6 in 7-p group yields payoff 16 that is smaller than min=5's yield in 8-p group at 17, people may be aiming at 8p group of min=6 down the road, thus not willing to settle for min=5 already now. They also realized that it's easy to go down but hard to get up with the min.!
[4] After breakup, every single voted for all other intermediate groups/singles. Yet, 2/7 refused to merge with any of the min=5 singles. By the merger rule of highest mutual inclination merging first, pair-wise singles merger has 100% mutual agreement, and 2-4 + 2-5 formed on random selection among 3 candidates.
[5] Final noise out of fear!? Table A2 [1] In fact, the approval rate between either of singles of #1,6,7,9 and the 4-2/4-8 group was 100%. This merger was chosen at random. Apparently, 2/8 group did not discriminate between min=5 and min=1 members. Yet, 4-1 adopted the norm of previous 4-2/4-8 group with minor reservation!
[2] Two 4p groups merged to one 8p. After that, people seemed to tolerate small conservative min=5 in the first period. [1] 5-10 apparently thought it was the best for him to choose 0, until after the 1st section.
[2] Min= 1,0,1,1. Most chose to exit.
[3] Choice of 0 for 5-3 in the rest of the treatment.
[4] All groups broke up but the orange one, which failed to merge with any single due to preference difference.
[5] 5-1 willing to merge with all but 5-9, thus including 3/5 group. Stranger still, 5-5 willing to stay with 5-3 despite 0/0. Consequently, this bad outcome. We learn from this that discrimination regarding future partners is really crucial. Bad experience also sours the general atmosphere in society and makes people become too conservative and discriminating as overreaction!
[6] First time min=6 within a 2p group. But too scared to adopt one from the min=4 group.
[7] They now felt safe enough after performance of min=6,6,6, to adopt one from the min=4 group. It was a success, due to clear expectation/norm for the newcomer to follow.
[8] 2 other groups with min=5 and =6 emerged. With more time, there might have been a chance for further coordination success.
Note, successful merger took place and failed to expand as seed groups the first 3 times before last cycle. [1] 5-4 oversensitive: his general strategy was to start high but no patience if min < than his action.
[2] 5-0 refused to merge with any and was content with min=6 in this 2p group. No other stable min=6 groups have emerged for 5-9 to opt out for though. Experience in 1st segment tells them that it's very risky and might take very long to get into stable min=5/6 groups, not to mention to grow with it.
[3] Not interested in the 2p group with min=5/5/5 or the singles from min=3/4/5 2p group.
[4] 5-4 wished to merge with only the min=6 2p, but 5-0 not interested in them.
[5] Everybody wished to join the min=6 group, ever after periods 10-12, only exception being 5-8 in 13-15.
[6] Despite min= 4,6,6 in (5-6, 5-7) group, 5-3 and 5-4, and 5-10 did not want to merge with either 5-6 or 5-7. 5-8 not willing to merge with 5-7. But 5-6 was willing to be back with 5-7.
It's like a class society: lower classes want to be admitted into the highest one, which doesn't want them; yet, fellow low class guys aren't good enough for joint venture!
Community 5 (Coordination failure)
Reasons for failure: (1) The history for the first 2 cycles was too bad. This caused no trust among the members, which in turn kept the effort continually low. (2) When there popped up a "good" group, nobody dared to join, in fear of some other newcomers choosing 'low'. (3) A zero-tolerance attitude seemed to dominate, in that everyone chose the group minimum of the last round or even lower. No leadership towards a higher group minimum could materialize. (4) At the end of round 21, one 3p group with min=6 and one 2p group with min=5 emerged. They might have achieved efficient coordination, had the game stayed on longer.
In general, community 5 is a great demonstration of how efficient coordination might fail in spite of some facilitating environment. Fear of risk might spread out like a pest to prevent that. RRS also intends to experimentally study the problem of large-size coordination failure in weakest-link games like our papers here. They define a "neighborhood game" (NG) as follows to do so. Assume there are n players. Each player ∈ simultaneously chooses a strategy = ( , ) where is interpreted as the effort and ⊂ indicates the set of players she wishes to connect to. Given the strategy profile = ( ) ∈ , a neighborhood for player i, ( ) ⊂ ⊂ , is endogenously defined as including all players ∈ such that ∈ , i.e., all players who mutually wish to connect to player i. For simplicity, we deviate slightly from RRS's notation and assume ∈ ( ) always. Let = # ( ), then player i's payoff is given in the following adapted form.
Appendix 3: Additional Data
(A1) ( ) = −1 −1 ( min ∈ ( ) − + )
Caveat 1: The NG as defined above is not your typical WL game
When describing a standard WL game, their BT, RRS (p. 3) wrote, "A player's own chosen effort determines her individual cost and the lowest effort chosen in the group the benefit each group member receives." In other words, the group minimum determines the benefit of the collaboration for all members the same way. All real-world examples of WL coordination games RRS and others in the literature discussed share this feature. In the NG above, however, this crucial feature we associate with any WL coordination game is lost. Consider the simple illustration with 7 players. Suppose each chooses the effort = . On the other hand, player 7 wishes to connect to all, while all other players only want to connect to exact one stranger beside themselves, namely, player 7. So, 7 = while = { , 7}, ∀ ≠ 7, in the NG. However, while players 1 and 7 in 7 face min = 1, any other player i in 7 faces min = ≠ 1, for eventual payoffs. Thus, the neighborhood for any player does not constitute a WL game among all "neighbors", as defined thus far.
Despite this caveat, the basic notion of NG is conducive to a proper analysis of endogenous large-size coordination, with proper modifications. Let us call a neighborhood in NG closed, if ∀ ∈ , = . If is closed ∀ ∈ , then we end up with a partition of the community into mutually exclusive closed neighborhoods. Now, starting with an NG as described, assume there is a condition or procedure that admits only closed neighborhoods as "group formation" outcomes, then we end up with NG version of the endogenous-size WL game. All existing papers on endogenous-size WL game indeed deal exclusively with closed neighborhoods.
YXT procedure as an example of WL-NG. Our study here (YXT) has separate stages for group formation and effort action. For group formation, they start with an initial partition from the previous round, 0 . By the exit decision, we first get an intermediate finer partition with closed neighborhoods, 1 . Then, each player casts votes on desired mergers by selecting a mapping : ↦ {0,1} that is required to be 1 -measurable, i.e. for any ∈ , ( ) = 1 iff ( ) = 1 ∀ ∈ . Let = ( ) denote the voting profile. Now, let � � ∈ {0,1} be i's vote for , then = ∑ ( ) ∈ / is the vote ratio in that is in favor of merger with . Our super majority rule means that the merger between and is admissible iff both ≥ 0.6 and ≥ 0.6. Now, let = (∑ ( ) ∈ + ∑ ( ))/ ∈ ( + ) denote total vote ratio in favor of a respective merger. The merger is carried out where is the highest, with ties broken randomly. Then, take the involved closed neighborhoods away from the others and repeat the procedure based on among the remaining closed neighborhoods in 1 successively till there is no further admissible merger left. This would yield another partition of closed neighborhoods 2 that is rawer than 1 , which then serves as the valid group formation for the next round of localized WL games within the confines of those closed neighborhoods.
In similar veins, the group formation procedures in Weber (2006) and Salmon and Weber (2009) can be stated in these NG terms that still preserve the WL feature of closed neighborhoods. We also see that the comparative simplicity of group formation procedure of RRS is only achieved by sacrificing the crucial closedness feature for WL games.
Caveat 2: NG without closedness requirement opens doors for effect of social preferences
In WL games played within closed neighborhoods, there is no present benefit not to reduce one's effort to the expected minimum. A higher than minimum effort only makes sense as means to coax the min-player to also raise his effort for future gains. In contrast, in RRS's NG, keeping one's effort above the minimum of her own neighborhood can help other players earn higher payoffs in their own neighborhood. For example, in our numerical example above player 7 faces a min=1 in N 7 , but if she reduced effort to 1, then players i= 2-6 would all face min=1 in their respective neighborhood instead of previously min=i. So, neglecting the non-WL issue for a moment, success in RRS-NG is not directly comparable with outcome of "similar-looking" WL-NG like YXT's or Weber's, where no such special effect of social preference is at work.
Caveat 3: Heavy load of information may make the task too easy
As well-known in the literature, performance in WL games improves with available information on players' choices. While YXT provides the minimum on such information, thus providing a toughest possible test ground for the success of our endogenous grouping mechanism, RRS elects to provide the maximal level of information. In particular, everyone knows everyone else's past effort choices, and even their exact chosen sets of links in the past, regardless of whether they are in any way connected. The latter may directly and more straightforwardly reveal sanctioning intentions against certain behaviors than when the insight of such sanctions is only indirectly and imperfectly hidden in the final regrouping outcome
